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The Long-Term Effects of Job Search Requirements: 
Evidence from the UK JSA Reform
*
 
This paper investigates long-term returns from unemployment compensation, exploiting 
variation from the UK JSA reform of 1996, which implied a major increase in job search 
requirements for eligibility and in the related administrative hurdle. Search theory predicts 
that such changes should raise the proportion of non-claimant nonemployed, with 
consequences on search effort and labor market attachment, and lower the reservation wage 
of the unemployed, with negative effects on post-unemployment wages. I test these ideas on 
longitudinal data from Social Security records (LLMDB). Using a difference in differences 
approach, I find that individuals who start an unemployment spell soon after JSA introduction, 
as opposed to six months earlier, are 2.5-3% more likely to move from unemployment into 
Incapacity Benefits spells, and 4-5% less likely to have positive earnings in the following 
year. This latter employment effect only vanishes four years after the initial unemployment 
shock. Also, annual earnings for the treated individuals are lower than for the non-treated. 
These results suggest that while tighter search requirements were successful in moving 
individuals off unemployment benefits, they were not successful in moving them onto long-
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Despite a substantial literature on the impact of unemployment insurance (UI) on the duration of
unemployment and re-employment rates,1 less is known on its long-term eﬀects on work careers.
But the channels through which UI aﬀects the process of return to work, mainly job search eﬀort
and reservation wages, are clearly also likely to have an impact on the quality of post-unemployment
jobs and in general on future work careers. For example it may be argued that more generous UI
gives workers the opportunity of not simply accepting the ﬁrst job oﬀer that comes along, but of
waiting for a good job, that provides the best match for their skills.
Since early work by Diamond (1981), a number of papers in the theoretical literature have
pointed out that UI may have beneﬁcial eﬀects, mainly by encouraging workers to wait for high-
productivity jobs in an environment with search frictions and heterogeneous jobs (Acemoglu, 2001,
Acemoglu and Shimer, 1999, 2000, and Marimon and Zilibotti, 1999). However, recent empirical
work has generally found little evidence of beneﬁcial eﬀects of UI on post-unemployment earnings
or job stability (see Card, Chetty and Weber, 2007a, and references therein).
This paper provides new evidence on the long-term returns from UI, exploiting variation from
the UK Jobseekers’ Allowance (JSA) reform of 1996. The JSA was introduced in October 1996
to replace the previous Unemployment Beneﬁt/Income Support system, and represented a major
reform to the existing UK system of welfare beneﬁts for the unemployed. One of the most important
changes with respect to the previous system was a substantial tightening of search requirements
for eligibility and in the related administrative hurdle. There is now broad consensus on the strong
positive eﬀects of the JSA on the claimant outﬂow rate. In particular, the months following JSA
introduction coincided with a record fall in the number of unemployment beneﬁt claimants.
In this paper I explore the link between tighter search requirements and a number of post-
unemployment outcomes, including future employment rates, weeks worked, earnings and new
beneﬁt spells. The impact of higher search requirements on average search intensity is theoretically
ambiguous, as some will search more intensively to meet the requirements, while others may con-
sider the requirements too burdensome and give up search (see Manning, 2005), with an ambiguous
impact on the exit rate into new jobs. But the introduction of stricter eligibility criteria unam-
biguously reduces utility during claimant job search, with negative eﬀects on reservation wages and
post-unemployment wages, and raises the share of nonclaimants in the nonemployment stock, thus
possibly raising the take-up rate of other kinds of beneﬁts and lowering future employment rates.
Experimental evidence for the US indeed tends to show that tighter job search requirements have
negative, albeit mild, eﬀects on the time spent of beneﬁts, while the eﬀects on re-employment rates
1See, among others, Atkinson and Mickewright (1991), Krueger and Meyer (2002) and Meyer (1995) for extensive
surveys, and Lalive, van Ours and Zweimüller (2007) for more recent evidence.
2are less clear-cut (see Meyer, 1995), thus warning that not all those who are moved oﬀ beneﬁts
necessarily ﬁnd new jobs. Related to this point, Card, Chetty and Weber (2007b) ﬁnd that the
spike in the re-employment hazard at beneﬁt exhaustion is much smaller than the spike in the
unemployment exit hazard, indicating that many workers leave the unemployment register without
returning to work.
I use a diﬀerence in diﬀerences approach to estimate the eﬀects of unemployment compensation
on subsequent careers. I compare long-term outcomes for cohorts of unemployment entrants before
and after JSA introduction in October 1996. As these two cohorts may diﬀer in seasonal factors,
I construct similar reference cohorts for 1997 and 1998, and then look at diﬀerence in diﬀerences
across cohorts and years.
There is an aspect of the JSA rules that makes this procedure non-standard, namely that when
the JSA was introduced, the new eligibility requirements applied not only to the new claimant
inﬂow, but to the existing stock of unemployed claimants as well, so there is no major discontinuity
to expect between labor market outcomes of workers who became unemployed just before and just
after JSA introduction. But the distance between the start date of an unemployment claimant
spell and the date of JSA introduction is indicative of the spell’s probability of being treated, and
this will be the basis of identiﬁcation. The key caveat to a causal interpretation of the resulting
estimates is that unemployment entry cohorts may diﬀer in unobservable characteristics that aﬀect
their post-unemployment outcomes, independently of JSA rules. A related concern is that seasonal
factors may vary over time, and thus that diﬀerences in diﬀerences in labor market outcomes across
unemployment entry cohorts and years may not simply pick up the eﬀect of JSA, but also the
eﬀect of potential interactions between, say, seasonality and business cycles. I investigate these
possibilities with a number of robustness tests. First, for all entry cohorts in 1996-1998, I control
for the vacancy to unemployment ratio in the month of unemployment entry, in order to capture
the eﬀect of changing aggregate labor market conditions. Second, I run a falsiﬁcation test on a
“placebo” JSA reform in 1997, using 1998 and 1999 entry cohorts to control for seasonal factors.
Third, I select entry cohorts in alternative ways and use the quarter of entry as an instrument for
the probability of being treated. None of these tests seem to invalidate the results of the main
diﬀerence in diﬀerences estimates.
My empirical analysis leads to three main ﬁndings. First, JSA has had a strong, positive and
signiﬁcant impact on the outﬂow from claimant unemployment for the individuals aﬀected, but a
negative impact on weeks worked one year later. While the reform successfully managed to move
claimants oﬀ beneﬁts, it was not successful in getting them onto new, lasting jobs. Thus it seems
that job search requirements mostly worked through raising the non-monetary search eﬀort costs
of remaining on UI, rather than enhancing job ﬁnding rates. Second, I ﬁnd that JSA has had a
3negative and signiﬁcant impact on post-unemployment annual earnings. My estimates indicate an
initial impact of about 600£ on annual earnings, which persists for as much as 4-5 years after an
unemployment shock. Log weekly earnings (conditional on working) are also somewhat reduced by
the JSA, although the associated eﬀects are too imprecise to exclude a wide variety of scenarios.
Third, while JSA has moved individuals oﬀ unemployment-related beneﬁts, it has increased the
incidence of other beneﬁts, most notably health-related beneﬁts. Starting a spell soon after JSA
introduction, as opposed to six months earlier, implies an increase of 2.5-3% in the probability
of claiming Incapacity Beneﬁts (the equivalent Disability Insurance in the US) six months after
unemployment exit.
My work complements existing evidence on the impact of UI on labor market careers by investi-
gating long-run eﬀects of tighter search requirements on post-unemployment outcomes. I use social
security data containing complete labor market histories. These allow me to combine information
on beneﬁt spells and earnings, and to achieve a more long-term perspective on the impact of UI
than previously addressed in the literature. Furthermore, UI systems have several institutional
features, and I estimate the eﬀects of major changes in job search requirements, while most of the
previous literature focused on the eﬀects of either changes in UI beneﬁt levels or in their maximum
duration. As it will be illustrated below, an increase in search requirements is predicted to lower
reservation wages and raise exits into nonclaimant nonemployment, even when the actual level of
beneﬁts received remains unchanged. Finally, I consider a new potential dimension of the long-term
eﬀects of UI, namely the start of other beneﬁt spells, with potential consequences on total beneﬁt
expenditure. This relates to a recent literature on higher take-up rates of health-related beneﬁts
in a number of countries (see Autor and Duggan, 2003, 2006, for the US; and Faggio and Nickell,
2003, for the UK).
The paper is organized as follows. The next Section discusses related work. Section 3 describes
the JSA features that are going to be relevant in my analysis. Section 4 proposes a simple job
search model to represent the likely eﬀects of JSA. Section 5 describes the data set used. Section
6 presents my methodology and some preliminary evidence. Section 7 presents my main ﬁndings
on the eﬀect of JSA on a number of post-unemployment outcomes and robustness tests. Section 8
ﬁnally concludes.
2 Related work
This work is related to two main strands of literature on welfare reforms, namely the large existing
literature on the impact of tighter job search requirements for UI eligibility on beneﬁt duration,
and the less abundant literature on the long-term eﬀects of UI generosity on post-unemployment
earnings.
4Evidence on the impact of job search requirements on the time spent of beneﬁts is relevant
to the analysis of the paper, as this would naturally represent a kind of ﬁrst stage for more long-
term eﬀects of UI. For instance, if time on beneﬁts did not respond to the tightening of search
requirements, it would be hard to expect much eﬀect of this on post-unemployment outcomes.
There now exists a large body of experimental work on the eﬀects of increased enforcement of
search requirements, based on a number of US social experiments carried out in the late 1970s and
1980s. Meyer (1995) provides an extensive survey and evaluation of these experiments, and ﬁnds
that the adopted combinations of search requirements and assistance implied some reduction in the
number of weeks on beneﬁts. Estimated eﬀects are around half a week for most experiments, and
up to 3.3 weeks for the Washington Alternative Work Search Experiment (see also Johnson and
Klepinger, 1994). At the same time, the impact on weeks worked tends to be less clear-cut and
often imprecisely estimated, suggesting that not all transitions oﬀ beneﬁts represents new hires.2
For the UK there has been a randomized experiment in 1986, the so-called Restart Programme,
which randomly assigned claimants who had spent twelve months of beneﬁts (later reduced to
six) to treatment consisting in counseling and tighter enforcement of eligibility requirements, and
was essentially a precursor to the JSA, except that the JSA did not include an explicit counselling
element. The Restart seems to have signiﬁcantly increased the exit rate from unemployment (Dolton
and O’Neill, 1996) and to have had beneﬁcial long-term employment eﬀects for men treated, though
not for women (Dolton and O’Neill, 2002).
A UK-based study of JSA may contribute to the evidence provided by the mostly US-based
experimental studies in a number of ways. First, it seems that the JSA had a stronger bite on the
claimant unemployment outﬂow than most US experiments, and thus one may expect that ﬁndings
from the US social experiments may not necessarily generalize to other scenarios. Second, most
existing experiments involve combinations of search requirements and counselling services, and it
may be diﬃcult to determine the relative merits of diﬀerent measures. Finally, the use of social
security data in the evaluation of the JSA provides a more long-term perspective on the impact of
UI rules and on a wider variety of outcome measures than typically studied in existing work.
The existing literature on the impact of the generosity of UI on post-unemployment outcomes
is not as large, and less conclusive. Early studies from the 1970s tend to identify the eﬀect of UI on
post-unemployment earnings by exploiting individual variation in the replacement ratio. Among
these, Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976) look at the eﬀect of the UI replacement ratio on the change
in earnings before and after unemployment using data from the US National Longitudinal Survey,
and ﬁnd that a 25% increase in the replacement ratio yields a 7% increase in post-unemployment
2More recent evaluations of US randomized experiments tend to ﬁnd negative eﬀects of tighter search requirements
on UI duration (see for example Klepinger et al., 1997), although in some cases the estimated eﬀect is at most quite
small (Ashenfelter et al., 1999). See also the recent survey by Fredriksson and Holmlund (2006).
5wages for older men, with lower or non signiﬁcant eﬀects for other demographic groups. Burgess
and Kingston (1976) and Holen (1977) follow a similar approach on Service to Claimants data, and
estimate that an extra dollar in weekly beneﬁts raises post-unemployment annual earnings by 25
and 36 dollars, respectively. In contrast, Classen (1977) ﬁnds no signiﬁcant eﬀect of UI on earnings
using data on claimants from the Continuous Wage and Beneﬁt History.
It can be argued that exploiting individual variation in replacement ratios is not ideal as this
may be correlated with some unobserved individual characteristics, and Cox and Oaxaca (1990)
who review this literature tend to dismiss positive ﬁndings, and conclude that “one can ﬁnd no
compelling evidence in support of the proposition that UI increases wages because of better matches
and increased job stability” (p. 236).
Related studies in the more recent literature are sparse, and tend to conclude that the earnings
eﬀects of UI are non-signiﬁcant or at best very modest. Addison, McKinley and Blackburn (2000)
use data from Displaced Worker Surveys and only ﬁnd (weak) evidence of a favorable impact of
UI on post-unemployment earnings when comparing recipients and non-recipients, and even in this
case the estimates obtained are substantially smaller than those obtained by earlier studies who
found evidence of positive eﬀects. Belzil (2001) and Juraida (2002) look at post-unemployment
job duration as a measure of job quality using cohorts of Canadian and US displaced workers
respectively. While Belzil ﬁnds no causal impact of UI beneﬁt duration on post-unemployment
job duration, Juraida ﬁnds that UI eligibility actually increases the probability of future layoﬀs.
Card et al. (2007a) exploit discontinuities in severance payments and UI beneﬁt entitlement in
Austria, based on previous job seniority, and ﬁnd no beneﬁcial eﬀects of either transfer on post-
unemployment earnings or job stability. Similar results are obtained by Van Ours and Vodopivec
(2008), who exploit the change introduced by a Slovenian UI reform that substantially reduced the
potential beneﬁt duration. Finally, Paserman (2008) estimates a structural job search model, and
ﬁnds that changes in the level of beneﬁts have negligible impact on re-employment wages, and only
aﬀect job ﬁnding rates via search intensity.
While the driving variation analyzed by all papers in this literature consists of changes on the
level and/or in the potential duration of beneﬁts, I will mostly study the impact of changes in job
search requirements, as implied by the JSA reform. As shown in Section 4, these requirements
can have an eﬀect on the workers’ reservation wages even when the actual level of beneﬁt per-
ceived remains unchanged. Moreover, a tightening of search requirements may raise the number of
claimants who leave unemployment without ﬁnding a job, and such transitions into “nonclaimant”
nonemployment may have more severe consequences on re-employment outcomes, as they typically
imply stronger detachment from the labor market than claimant nonemployment.
63 The JSA: characteristics and existing evaluations
The JSA was introduced on 7 October 1996 in order to replace the existing system of Unemploy-
ment Beneﬁts (UB) and Income Support (IS). UB represented unemployment insurance, was based
on previous social security contributions, and was not means tested. IS was an unemployment as-
sistance scheme that was means tested. The JSA has a contributory component (contJSA), which
replaced UB, and a means tested component (incJSA), which replaced IS.3
In both the old and the new regime the means-tested component of unemployment compen-
sation was much more important than the contributory component, simply because the majority
of unemployment claimants have insuﬃcient social security contributions to be eligible for UB or
contJSA, whether at all or in its full duration. For example, only 16% of unemployed workers
receiving beneﬁts in February 1996 were receiving UB, and only 11% were receiving contJSA one
year later in the new regime (see Department for Social Development, 1999, Table 1).
The features of JSA that are relevant for this study are the changes introduced with respect
to the previous UB/IS system, and the transitional arrangements for individuals receiving either
UB or IS when JSA came into action.4 JSA introduction implied some changes in the duration
and level of beneﬁts. UB had a maximum entitlement period of 12 months, and this was halved
to 6 months under JSA. In 1996 UB was £48.25 per week for single persons, with a £29.75 adult
dependant supplement, while IS was £47.90 for single persons aged 25+, £37.90 for single persons
aged 18-24, and £75.20 for couples in which at least one spouse was aged 18+.5 Thus UB and IS
payments were very similar except for young people, who received about 20% less under IS than
UB. When JSA was introduced it was initially payable at exactly the same rates and conditions as
IS. Thus the only category who saw their beneﬁts cut in the new JSA regime consisted of youths
who would have been eligible for UB under the old regime. But because the proportion of UB
recipients was low, this change had an arguably limited impact. Nevertheless, all the results below
are presented separately for the 16-24 and the 25-64 year old groups.
The most signiﬁcant break with respect to the previous UB/IS regime was represented by
the substantial increase in job search requirements for eligibility and in the related administrative
hurdle. Claimants have to sign a Jobseeker’s Agreement, to be agreed with an Employment Oﬃcer,
in which they commit to actively seek work and to a number of speciﬁc search steps in order to
3After JSA introduction there is still a beneﬁt called IS, but it is not job-search related, and provides means-tested
welfare to selected demographic groups, most notably lone parents and carers of dependants with disabilities.
4A very detailed description of institutional and administrative aspects of the JSA is contained in the Jobseeker’s
Handbook by Pointer and Barnes (1997). The pre-existing UB/IS system is covered by Finn et al. (1996).
5In 1996, IS is payable at the full rate to individuals with savings below £3,000, at a reduced rate to individuals
with savings between £3,000 and £8,000, and is not payable to those with savings in excess of £8,000. 16 and 17
year olds were eligible for the £37.90 IS rate if living away from their parents or qualiﬁed for a disability premium;
otherwise were entitled to a £28.85 reduced rate.
7ﬁnd work, like how may employers at least they are going to contact every week, or how many
times at least they are going to contact a Jobcentre (see Poynter and Barnes, 1997, pp. 355-358).
They are required to keep a detailed diary of search steps undertaken, such as each phone call
made to a potential employer. The search diary is then checked against the initial agreement at
fortnightly interviews with the Employment Service, or more often if a claimant is suspected of
fraud. Claimants may be “directed” by the Employment Service staﬀ to take speciﬁc steps, and
if a claimant is still unemployed after 13 weeks, he is required to broaden his search and may not
turn down job oﬀers outside his main occupation. While it can be argued that these measures are
hardly enforceable, in so far one has control on job oﬀers received, it is possible that JSA may have
made an impact by introducing extra administrative hurdle and requiring more intensive contact
with the Employment Service. Evidence from social experiments has shown that in some cases a
substantial proportion of UI claimants who are selected for treatment involving both monitoring
and assistance in job search do not attend mandatory re-employment services and thus drop out
of the claimant count (see Dolton and O’Neill, 2002, for the UK and Johnson and Klepinger, 1994,
and Black et al, 2003, for the US). This eﬀect may, if anything, be even stronger for the JSA, which
does not oﬀer any active job search assistance service.
Although the new JSA rules ﬁt in a trend of tighter eligibility for unemployment compensation,
started in 1986 with the Restart Programme for those unemployed longer than twelve months, JSA
introduction represented a marked change in entitlement rules and in required interaction with the
Employment Service. In its current format, the UK unemployment compensation scheme has much
stronger emphasis on search requirements than the US scheme, but, unlike the US scheme, it has
potentially unlimited duration, subject to a means test.6
As this work is mostly going to focus on cohorts of unemployment entrants during the year of
JSA introduction, transitional arrangements from the UB/IS system to the JSA are going to play
an important role in my choice of methodology. During the pre-JSA period, all UB spells started
on or before 8 April 1996 and before 7 October 1996 had a maximum 6 (instead of 12) months
entitlement at the UB rate. More importantly, all existing UB and IS spells as of 7 October 1996
are transferred to the JSA system, and claimants had to ﬁll a Jobseeker’s Agreement soon after 7
October, and “were treated as having made a Jobseekers’ Agreement until the date in which an
actual Agreement is made” (Finn, Murray and Donnelly, 1996, p.64), using information provided
in their initial UB or IS form. The retroactive applicability of JSA was very much in the spirit to
sanction “those who were not previously assiduous in their job search or were claiming fraudulently”
(Rayner et al, 2000, p1).
6Despite the diﬀerence in search requirements, Krueger and Mueller (2008) ﬁnd that the average unemployed
worker in the US devotes about 41 minutes to job search on weekdays, while his/her UK counterpart devotes 8
minutes on average.
8The JSA has been generally perceived as a major reform of the UK welfare system for the
unemployed, and some of its eﬀects can be easily grasped by looking at time series of seasonally
adjusted ﬂows in and out of registered unemployment, shown in Figure 1. Soon after JSA intro-
duction, there was a marked increase in the claimant outﬂow, with little or no impact on the inﬂow
into the claimant register. As the solid line is Figure 2 shows, this translated into a more rapid
decline in the claimant unemployment stock, which was already falling in the months preceding
the reform. However, the dashed line in Figure 2 shows that around the same time the standard
ILO measure of unemployment was falling less markedly, and while the two series were quite close
during the ﬁrst half of the 1990s, ILO unemployment has remained much higher than the claimant
count since the late 1990s. Part of the reason why ILO unemployment was not falling as sharply
around the time of JSA introduction is that some of those who were leaving the register did not
move straight into employment.
Another interesting piece of evidence is the comovement between the claimant count and the
number of individuals on Incapacity Beneﬁts. Figure 3 plots these two series since 1995.7 Although
the rise in the IB roll during the sample period was much smaller than the fall in registered
unemployment, the two series are strongly negatively correlated (ρ = −0.874), and thus it makes
sense to look into possible spillovers on the IB take up rate when there is a sharp fall in registered
unemployment.
Oﬃcial evaluations of the JSA carried by the then Department of Social Security (now Depart-
ment for Work and Pension) agree in documenting a very strong impact of the JSA on the ﬂow oﬀ
the unemployment claimant register, see for example Rayner et al. (2000) and Smith et al. (2000).
More recently, McVicar (2008) studies a case of excused signing (and thus zero monitoring of search
eﬀort) within the JSA, during refurbishment of beneﬁt oﬃces in Northern Ireland, and ﬁnds that
periods with no monitoring strongly reduce the exit rate from beneﬁts.
However, optimistic conclusions on job search and employment eﬀects of search monitoring do
not seem to be granted. Closely related to this work, Manning (2005) ﬁnds in fact that the JSA
did not result in an overall increase in job search eﬀort, nor in higher job-ﬁnding rates. The next
section illustrates how these developments may in turn result in lower post-unemployment earnings
and/or higher exits from the labor force.
4 A job search model
A simple job search model is a useful framework to illustrate the likely impact of higher job
search requirements on post-unemployment outcomes. Manning (2005) proposes a search model
7Aggregate quarterly data on IB recipients become available through the Department for Work and Pensions only
for 1995 onwards.
9to represent the eﬀects of tighter search requirements on optimal search eﬀort. His model is in
the wage posting tradition, with an exogenous wage distribution and endogenous search eﬀort,
as in Mortensen (1986). Below I use a very similar framework to illustrate post-unemployment
outcomes such as earnings and transitions out of the labor force. In doing this I assume that only
the unemployed search for jobs, as this is the key aspect aﬀected by the JSA reform, while employed
job search, though empirically important, would not aﬀect the relevant predictions of the model.
Individuals are inﬁnitely lived, and maximize lifetime utility in continuous time. They can be
either employed or unemployed. When unemployed, they are paid unemployment compensation b,
and spend job search eﬀort s, assuming for the moment that b is not conditional on s. Search eﬀort
in turn costs c(s) and generates job oﬀers at rate λ(s). It is typically assumed that search costs are
convex in eﬀort, while returns are concave, thus c′(s) > 0, c′′(s) > 0, λ′(s) > 0, and λ′′(s) < 0.8
Oﬀers are random draws from an exogenous, known distribution F(w). When employed, individuals
are paid a wage w and face an exogenous risk of job loss δ.
Given this environment, the unemployed choose an optimal job search eﬀort level s, and a
reservation wage wR, representing the lowest acceptable wage oﬀer. The ﬂow value of unemployment










rW(w) = w + δ[U − W(w)], (2)
where r represents the intertemporal discount rate.
The reservation wage is deﬁned by rW(wR) = rU, i.e. it is the level of the wage that makes
employment equally valuable as unemployment, and given (1) this also implies rU = wR, i.e. the
ﬂow value of unemployment is equal to the reservation wage. Using integration by parts to rewrite
(1), and noting that W′(w) = 1/(r + δ), the reservation wage is implicitly deﬁned by
wR = rU = max
s
￿








Search eﬀort is set optimally at the level that equates the marginal costs of search with the
marginal beneﬁts, represented by the higher arrival rate of oﬀers, times the associated net gain






[1 − F(w)]dw. (4)
The key step is to observe how utility while unemployed and thus the reservation wage respond
to beneﬁts and search eﬀort. The reservation wage clearly increases with b, as unemployment
8For the existence of an interior solution in s in a model with constant b it is suﬃcient that either c
′′(s) > 0 or
λ
′′(s) < 0.











r + δ + λ(s)[1 − F(wR)]
> 0 (5)











[1 − F(w)]dw − c′(s)
￿
. (6)
Conditions (5) and (6) imply indiﬀerence curves in s and b like those drawn in Figure 4, where
higher curves are associated with higher levels of utility. Figure 4 also depicts the eﬀect of a fall in






wR [1 − F(w)]dw






[1 − F(w)]dw − c′′(s∗)
￿−1
< 0.
The rate at which the unemployed ﬁnd work is h = λ(s∗)[1−F(wR)]. Thus a reduction in b raises
the job ﬁnding rate via both an increase in job search eﬀort (and thus in the arrival rate of oﬀers)
and a reduction in the reservation wage (and thus a fall in the rejection rate). At the same time,
it lowers the expected post-unemployment wage, E(w|w > wR).
The discussion so far assumed constant beneﬁts, unconditional on search eﬀort. Let’s assume
now that unemployment beneﬁts are only paid above a certain threshold of search eﬀort, s. Indi-
viduals whose search eﬀort exceeds or is equal to s are formally classiﬁed as UI claimants, while
individuals with search eﬀort below s are nonclaimants, and typically receive lower income than
claimants. This however is not necessarily zero in expected value if nonclaimants face some positive
probability to receive beneﬁts that are not search related (like housing or health-related beneﬁts).
In this context the introduction of JSA can be represented as an increase in s.
Consider indiﬀerence curves such as those represented in Figure 5. The increase in requirements
from s1 to s2 would raise search eﬀort from s∗
1 to the corner solution s∗
2 = s2, and would move
individuals on to a lower indiﬀerence curve, characterized by a lower reservation wage. As a
consequence job ﬁnding rates are higher, and these are precisely the “intended” consequences of
the JSA. Consider now an individual whose initial search eﬀort is lower, as illustrated in Figure 6,
such that he barely meets the more lenient requirements, i.e. s∗
1 = s1. With the new requirements
he would actually reduce his search eﬀort. In other words, not only would he not meet the new
requirements s2, but also it would no longer be worthwhile for him to keep his search eﬀort as high
as s1, thus s∗
2 < s∗
1. With lower reservation wages and lower search eﬀort, the eﬀect of the increase
in search requirements on the job ﬁnding rate of the unemployed is ambiguous. These could be
some “unintended” consequences of the JSA.
This framework delivers two main results that are going to be relevant for the empirical analysis
that follows. First, changes in s aﬀect the composition of the nonemployed between UI claimants
11and nonclaimants. To see this, note that changes in s do not aﬀect optimal search intensity for
workers with either very high initial search eﬀort, i.e. s∗
1 ≥ s2, or very low initial search eﬀort,
i.e. s∗
1 < s1. The former will be UI claimants in both regimes, while the latter will always be
nonclaimants. But workers who pick initial search eﬀort in the middle range s1 ≤ s∗
1 < s2 are
aﬀected by the change in search requirements. All of them are initially claiming UI; some of them
will ﬁnd it optimal to search harder when s is raised (as in Figure 5), and keep claiming UI;
while others will reduce search eﬀort (as in Figure 6), and stop claiming UI in the new regime.
This implies that an increase in s will raise the share of nonclaimants among the nonemployed
population. They can be either nonclaimant unemployed9 or nonparticipants, and may or may
not receive beneﬁts that are not job search related. Clearly, the change in the composition of the
nonemployed is more important the stronger the rise in eligibility requirements, s2 − s1.
Second, whether optimal search eﬀort increases (Figure 5) or decreases (Figure 6), utility enjoyed
when unemployed unambiguously falls as a consequence of an increase in s, and this holds even
when the actual level of beneﬁts received remains unchanged. This happens because some cash
payments that were initially made to the unemployed without too much questioning are now made
conditional on substantial search eﬀort, with some associated costs. Thus one would expect that
an increase in s lowers reservation wages and the quality of post-unemployment jobs.
Interestingly, the relative magnitude of these two eﬀects depends on the loss of income upon
leaving claimant unemployment, b2 − b1. When such diﬀerence is relatively high, individuals are
less likely to leave the claimant count for nonclaimant nonemployment, and even conditional on
staying on beneﬁts, they experience a higher utility loss, with stronger consequences on reservation
wages and re-employment wages. On the other hand, when the b2−b1 diﬀerence is low, the impact
on reservation wages is moderate, but even a small increase in search requirements would push
claimants oﬀ the register, with stronger consequences on the composition of nonemployment. In
the UK institutional context, the b2 − b1 diﬀerence is probably not very large, considering that
unemployment beneﬁts at the time of JSA introduction were only £47.90 per week,10 and that
upon loss of these beneﬁts individuals could apply for other kinds of beneﬁts, which are not search
related. Thus one may expect the JSA eﬀects on the composition of nonemployment to be more
important than its eﬀects on reservation wages and postunemployment wages.
Finally, if on top of higher search requirements, the level of beneﬁts is also falling, as it was
the case for workers aged 18-24 who were receiving UB before JSA introduction, this generates a
stronger fall in the reservation wage (as shown in Figure 4), and lowers the incentive to raise search
9To fall in this category, a worker may not meet the JSA search requirements but meet instead the ILO unemploy-
ment deﬁnition, which classiﬁes as unemployed those who have not worked more than one hour during the reference
period but who are “available for and actively seeking work”.
10Using gross weekly earnings for UK men in 1996Q4 as reference, this implies a replacement ratio of about 14%.
12eﬀort and meet the higher requirements, thus raising the proportion of workers who reduce search
eﬀort as a consequence of JSA introduction. Thus any fall in the level of beneﬁts would simply
reinforce the eﬀects of tighter search requirements on both post-unemployment wages and outﬂows
into nonclaimant unemployment.
5 Data
The data used in this paper are drawn from the Lifetime Labour Market Database (LLMDB),
administered by the Department for Work and Pensions. The LLMDB represents a 1% random
sample of social security records in Great Britain. Individuals covered are those whose National
Insurance numbers end in two given digits. The LLMDB provides a rich set of information on labor
histories of selected individuals from 1978 onwards. In particular, it has the advantage of linking
information on beneﬁt spells with information on earnings.
Speciﬁcally, the LLMDB provides start and end dates of beneﬁt spells, together with their type.
Types include job-search related beneﬁts, like UB and IS in the old system and JSA in the new
system; health related beneﬁts, like Incapacity Beneﬁts (IB) or the Disability Living Allowance
(DLA); in-work beneﬁts, like the Working Family Tax Credit (WFTC); retirement pensions; ma-
ternity allowances; and a few others.
All information on beneﬁt spells is in principle available since 1978, but the quality of beneﬁt
spells data until 1995 is poorer than for the later period. For example, beneﬁt spells seem to be
under-reported for the earlier period, and a relatively large proportion of them has missing, or
imputed, end dates.
I use unemployment claimants spells for 1996, 1997 and 1998. The LLMDB reports 66,707
unemployment beneﬁt spells started by British males between 1 January 1996 and 31 December
1997. According to the UK Oﬃcial Labour Market Statistics (Nomis), the male unemployment
inﬂow in the same period was 6,725,595. When LLMDB sampling is taken into account, the ﬁgures
stemming from the two sources are closely comparable.
Having said this, even in the post 1995 period, the accuracy of information on end dates of
spells is poorer than that on start dates. In particular, the IS end dates have very strong quarterly
spikes. This happens because all relevant information about IS spells is collected quarterly by the
Department for Work and Pensions; thus if an individual features in the sample with an ongoing
IS spell at the start of a given quarter, but is not on IS at the end of the quarter, he is assigned an
imputed completion date corresponding to the middle date of the quarter. As typically IS spells
follow UB spells, this bunching problem is going to produce spikes in the end dates of unemployment
spells in my sample in the pre-JSA regime. For this reason I choose to minimize the use of the
end date of spells in the empirical analysis, and all selection criteria used are based on spells start
13dates.
In the pre-JSA regime I construct unemployment spells by linking together UB and IS spells
that (partly) overlap, and UB and IS spells that do not overlap but have a maximum two weeks
window between the end date of the former and the start date of the latter. This is because a spell
out of beneﬁts of less than two weeks is highly unlikely to represent a short job spell, and thus for
my purpose the corresponding beneﬁt spells sequence best represents a single unemployment spell.
Also, bureaucratic procedures may require some time to move a claimant from unemployment
insurance to unemployment assistance beneﬁts, and this may explain some short gap between
beneﬁt spells. However, the results obtained are not sensitive to shortening such window to 7 or
zero days.
Information on employment and income is provided by ﬁscal years. Fiscal years in the UK
start on 6 April of a given year and end on 5 April of the following year, and in what follows all
annual indicators reported refer to ﬁscal, rather than calendar years. Employment and income
are represented by annual weeks worked and annual pre-tax pay, respectively. Both measures
are available from 1978 onwards. However, it should be noted that while from 1999 onwards the
number of weeks worked is reported directly within each National Insurance ﬁle, this has been
estimated by the Department for Work and Pensions for the period 1978-1998 using information on
known periods of nonemployment and self-employment. When applied to the post 1999 period, this
methodology reproduces fairly accurately the actual measure of weeks worked available (Needham,
2007).
Employment data from the LLMDB have two main shortcomings. First, the LLMDB does not
currently contain employment spells dates, but it reports the number of employment spells recorded
in a given year, so that it is possible to know how many jobs someone has held in a given year,
with the associated weeks worked and pay, but it is not possible to know their start and end dates,
nor their chronological order. This implies that the best measure of wages from this survey is the
average weekly wage over a ﬁscal year. Also, this means that it is not possible to know whether
the destination of a given unemployment spell is paid work, but it is possible to know whether and
how much an individual worked in the ﬁscal year following an unemployment spell.
Second, the LLMDB does not provide information on weekly hours worked. This is mostly a
drawback for the analysis of female employment and earnings, given that the incidence of part-time
work among British women is fairly high during my sample period (around 42% according to the
Labour Force Survey). Thus the empirical analysis will be restricted to males.
Figure 7 display raw data on employment and earnings from the LLMDB between 1978 and
2003. The average number of weeks worked in a year declined steadily in the sample period, while
both annual and weekly earnings increased. Weekly earnings have been increasing at an average
14rate of 5.8% per year during the sample period, and this corresponds to an average 1.2% real
growth.11 It is worthwhile to notice the blip in annual weeks worked in 1997-1998 and the dip in
annual earnings in 1996. The apparent anomalies could be potentially explained by the fact that
recording methods changed in 1997, and the LLMDB was moved on to a new National Insurance
computerized system. The move from the old to the new system may in part explain the observed
changes in variables of interest between 1996 and 1997.
6 Methodology and preliminary evidence
In order to assess the long-term eﬀects of JSA exposure on postunemployment outcomes, one
needs to take into account the retroactive nature of the reform, which applied to all unemployment
claimant spells as of 7 October 1996, including those started during the previous UB/IS regime.
In particular, this feature rules out major discontinuities in the relationship between the start
date of an unemployment spell and future outcomes. I will thus compare outcomes for cohorts of
unemployment entrants that are close enough in entry dates to be reasonably similar in aggregate
factors, but far enough to have signiﬁcantly diﬀerent probabilities of being treated by the JSA.
For a treatment group I use claimant unemployment spells for males aged 16-64, started in
the three months following JSA introduction, and more precisely between 7 October 1996 and 5
January 1997. All these spells are subject to the JSA rules. For a control group I use spells started
six to three months before JSA introduction, that is between 8 April and 7 July 1996.12 These
spells are initially not subject to JSA rules, but eventually become subject if they last beyond 7
October 1996. Thus the distinction between treatment and control is based on diﬀerent intentions
to treat.
There are a number of issues to be discussed to understand how good a control group this would
be. First, individuals in the control group may become treated if they do not exit unemployment
before 7 October 1996. Thus the most direct interpretation of the resulting estimates is the eﬀect
of being treated by JSA, as opposed to not being treated in ﬁrst 3-6 months of unemployment. But
further assumptions would be needed to allow for a more general interpretation of the estimates. For
example, if the treatment probability were randomly distributed among individuals in the control
group, conditional on observable characteristics, then the issue would be simply one of adequately
re-scaling the obtained eﬀect of JSA. For example, in my sample this probability happens to be
almost exactly 50%, and thus the coeﬃcients obtained on these treatment and control groups should
be multiplied by two.
11Using the retail price index from the Oﬃce for National Statistics.
12Note that the start date of my sample period, 8 April 1996, is also the date when entitlement for new UI recipients
is halved from 12 to 6 months. Thus in this sample there are no diﬀerences in entitlement between the pre- and
post-JSA period.
15But the probability of being treated in the control group depends on the timing of job ﬁnding,
and this is in general aﬀected by unobserved characteristics that deﬁne someone’s employability,
such as motivation, ability, search eﬀort etc. If the less-employable are also the less able in the labor
market, individuals who end up being treated in the control group have lower average unobserved
ability. Thus, what matters for the direction of the associated bias is whether the JSA is going to
have a stronger impact on post-unemployment earnings for the more or the less able workers. If
the former is true, the estimated eﬀect of the JSA obtained on these treatment and control groups
overestimates the true eﬀect, once scaling has been taken into account. If the latter is true, as it is
plausible, one obtains an underestimate of the true eﬀect. My estimates control for detailed past
employment histories, which should act as a good proxy for a number of relevant unobservables
(see also Card and Sullivan, 1988).
Second, I select control and treatment groups on the timing of job loss, and more precisely, on
the timing of signing-on for unemployment beneﬁts. One may worry about strategic behavior in
the time of signing-on in the presence of anticipatory eﬀects of JSA. And in principle individuals
may try to alter the signing-on behavior in the face of JSA by (i) signing-on earlier than they
would have done without the JSA; (ii) signing-on later; (iii) not signing-on at all. But how likely is
this kind of strategic behavior prior to JSA introduction? It may be argued that trying to sign-on
(shortly) earlier does not avoid treatment, as JSA is retroactive; signing-on later simply implies loss
of unemployment income, thus is clearly not optimal; and ﬁnally not signing-on at all implies again
loss of unemployment income: if one really dreads the prospect of the new JSA rules it is optimal
to sign-on initially and possibly collect a few weeks’ worth of beneﬁts before being sanctioned.
Some indirect evidence on this can be grasped by looking at Figure 8, which gives the number
of claimant unemployment spells started each week between 1 January 1996 and 31 December
1997. The pattern of the unemployment inﬂow is fairly smooth., and shows no sign of any unusual
behavior in the unemployment inﬂow around the time of JSA introduction. Figure 9 provides a
closer snapshot of daily inﬂow data for September and October 1996. This reveals a marked weekly
pattern in starting dates, with Mondays being by far the busiest days, and the frequency of new
spells declining monotonically during the week, but again there is no evidence of bunching of new
spells shortly before or after 7 October.
It would be interesting to be able to observe the same kind of evidence in the unemployment
outﬂow, but as already noted in Section 5 the LLMDB data are not ideal for this purpose, due
to heavily bunched ending dates of IS spells, which produce sizeable spikes in the end dates of
claimant unemployment spells, as shown in Figure 10. But oﬃcial labor market data reported in
Figure 1 show no unusual behavior in the unemployment outﬂow just before JSA introduction,
with a strong increase immediately afterwards.
16Finally, treatment and control groups are certainly going to be diﬀerent as far as seasonal
factors are concerned. For this reason I construct treatment and control groups for the same dates
in 1997 and 1998, and estimate the eﬀect of JSA on future outcomes using a diﬀerence in diﬀerences
strategy.13 I estimate an equation of the form
yi = β0 + β1C96
i + β2C97





+ γXi + εi (7)
where yi represents an outcome variable, Xi is a vector of individual characteristics, C96
i and C97
i are
dummy variables for the 1996 and 1997 cohorts, respectively, Ti denotes treatment (or, equivalently,
entry during quarter four), and the C96
i ∗ Ti interaction picks the eﬀect of JSA.
As the main underlying variation in treatment probabilities is deﬁned at the level of the quarter
of unemployment entry, standard errors need to be adjusted accordingly. With a small number of
clusters (six in this case, including treatment and controls in three yearly entry cohorts), clustering
at the group level can still deliver biased standard errors (Donald and Lang, 2007, and Cameron,
Gelbach and Miller, 2008), and indeed standard errors clustered at the group level in estimating
equation (7) were in several cases even lower than non-adjusted standard errors. While there is
no obvious remedy for a problem of few clusters, I tried two alternatives. First, I cluster standard
errors at the monthly level, as opposed to the quarterly level, thus using eighteen instead of six
clusters. Second, I bootstrap t−statistics on the main coeﬃcient of interest, allowing for clustering
at either the monthly or the group level (see Cameron et al, 2008, Appendix). These procedures
gave very similar results as far as the signiﬁcance of the main eﬀects of interest are concerned, and
for simplicity all standard errors reported in what follows are those obtained by clustering at the
monthly level.
Turning to identiﬁcation, speciﬁcation (7) is going to deliver an unbiased estimate for the
coeﬃcient of interest, β4, if
E(εi|C96
i = 1,Ti = 1,Xi) − E(εi|C96
i = 1,Ti = 0,Xi) =
E(εi|C96
i = 0,Ti = 1,Xi) − E(εi|C96
i = 0,Ti = 0,Xi). (8)
In other words, as treatment and control groups are selected on the basis of their date of job loss,
the underlying identifying assumption is that the correlation between the timing of job loss and
unobservables, if any, be the same across cohorts. This assumption is likely to be violated in two
cases. First, it would not hold if seasonal patterns diﬀer across the three years considered, but this
does not seem to be the case because when I control for aggregate labor market tightness in the
13Strictly speaking, one extra cohort of unemployment entrants would be suﬃcient for this purpose. The use of
two extra cohorts (1997 and 1998) has the advantage to help better pin down seasonal factors, and to increase the
number of clusters to 6 (one treatment and one control group for each cohort), so as to improve computation of
standard errors.
17month of unemployment entry the resulting estimates are hardly aﬀected. Second, (8) would also
not hold if there are reasons to expect strategic signing-on timing - but I have argued above that
this is unlikely, and Figures 8 and 9 show no evidence of uncommon behavior in unemployment
inﬂow rates around the time of JSA introduction. Also, indirect evidence on this can be gathered
by observable pre-treatment characteristics of individuals in control and treatment groups in the
two cohorts.
Descriptive statistics for treatment and control groups are reported in Table 1 and Figures 11-
14. Table 1 reports information on age, the current unemployment spell, and future beneﬁt spells,
separately for youths (16-24 years old) and adults (25-64 years old). There are about 8,500 spells
in the youth sample and 16,400 in the adult sample. These groups are very similar in their age, but
diﬀer in the duration of their current spell and in its destination. The control group in the 1996
cohort tends to have longer spells than the other groups, and this is the main eﬀect emphasized
by the oﬃcial evaluations of the JSA, although not with a diﬀerence in diﬀerences approach. This
group also has a lower probability to experience new beneﬁt spells in the near future.
More detailed information on earnings and weeks worked for treatment and control groups in
diﬀerent cohorts is presented in Figures 11 and 12, for the youth and the adult samples respectively.
Panel A in Figure 11 gives the proportion of young men with positive earnings in each year for
treatment and control groups in the three cohort. The relevant series are plotted for the period 1990
onwards, because the vast majority in this sample enters the labor force after 1990. The vertical
line in correspondence of 1996 represents the introduction of JSA. This coincides with the reference
unemployment spell for the 1996 cohort, while the reference unemployment spells for the 1997 and
1998 cohorts takes place one and two years later, respectively. Overall, the fraction of men with
positive earnings rises for all groups by about 50 percentage points during the 6 years prior to JSA
treatment, and this is clearly an age eﬀect, reﬂecting labor market entry of this relatively young
cohort. After the reference unemployment shock, the trend in such fraction ﬂattens out or even
declines. It is also worthwhile to notice that the proportion with positive earnings has a spike in the
year of job loss, simply telling that the reference unemployment spell tends to follow in most cases
a period of paid employment. The pre-shock trends are identical for treatment and control groups,
and if anything the level of the proportion of those in paid work is slightly higher for the control
than the treatment. Panel B plots average annual earnings, including zero values for those not
in work, and shows again an identical upward trend in earnings in the pre-shock period. Panel C
presents a very similar picture for annual weeks worked (including zero values for non-participants),
and again Panel D for log weekly earnings. Figure 12 plots the corresponding trends for the adult
sample, starting in 1985. The main diﬀerences with respect to the younger sample are, as expected,
a higher levels of earnings, and also the absence of strong upward pre-shock trends.
18An interesting feature that stands out from Figures 11 and 12 is that pre-treatment trends are
in general very close for treatment and control groups for the three cohorts. More importantly, the
associated diﬀerence in diﬀerences between the 1996 cohort on the one hand and the later cohorts
on the other hand is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero for any of the variables considered in the
pre-treatment period. Figures 13 and 14 plot the diﬀerence in diﬀerences for the same variables
represented in Figures 11 and 12, where year 0 corresponds to 1996, 1997 and 1998 for the three
cohorts respectively. In Panel A a probit version of equation (7) is estimated, with no X variables
included, while Panels B-D are based on OLS. The solid lines represent the point estimates for
β4 (and, speciﬁcally, marginal eﬀects in Panel A), and the dashed lines represent the 90% and
95% conﬁdence intervals, showing that, for the four labor market indicators considered, all point
estimates lie within the 90% interval in the pre-treatment period, except in one instance only (the
diﬀerence in weekly wages for adults three years before the reference unemployment spell). Recall
that in order to consistently estimate β4 one needs that any diﬀerence in unobservables between
the treatment and control groups be the same across the two cohorts. Using work histories as a
proxy for individual unobservables, the evidence presented in Figures 13 and 14 is in line with my
identifying assumption.
It should ﬁnally be noted that some of the trends in Figures 11 and 12 seem to diverge after JSA
introduction, and in some cases more for the 1996 than the later cohorts, as also shown by point
estimates in Figures 13 and 14 for the post-treatment period. This is indicative of potential JSA
eﬀects on future outcomes. The next section will provide more detailed results on post-treatment
eﬀects, controlling for age of respondents and pre-treatment trends.
7 Results
7.1 Employment and earnings
I start by presenting evidence on the eﬀects of JSA on the probability of leaving the unemployment
claimant register. Not only was this the main eﬀect emphasized by the oﬃcial evaluations of the
JSA, but also it could be the main channel through which one can expect more long-term eﬀects.
I thus estimate a duration model of exit from unemployment, using a speciﬁcation analogous
to (7), except that the duration model is non-linear. The results of the Cox proportional hazard
model are presented in Panel A of Table 2, where the coeﬃcients reported refer again to the
interaction term between the 1996 cohort and treatment. All speciﬁcations also include separate
dummy variables for treatment and the 1996 and 1997 cohorts. The standard errors are clustered
at the monthly inﬂow level.
The ﬁrst two columns in the Table refer to the young sample, and the next two to the adult
sample. The regression of column 1 only controls for treatment and yearly cohorts as extra re-
19gressors, and shows evidence of a 11.4% increase in the unemployment exit hazard for the young.
Column 2 also controls for age, age squared, and past employment history (i.e. the total number
of weeks worked and annual earnings in each of the previous three years and their square).14 As
expected from the evidence presented in Table 1 and Figure 11, the inclusion of further covariates
hardly aﬀects the results. The next two columns show very similar results for the adults. Recall
that the control group here includes about 50% of treated individuals, and thus a simple rescaling
of these estimates would predict a reduction in unemployment duration over 20%, corresponding
to about 6-8 weeks, across age groups and speciﬁcations.
However, as information on ending dates of spells is heavily bunched at quarterly frequencies, a
continuous time duration model is not the best way to describe unemployment exit. Another way
to look at the eﬀect of JSA on the outﬂow from the unemployment register consists in comparing
the fraction of individuals in each group who were no longer claiming after three or six months
since unemployment entry. Interestingly, three and six months correspond almost exactly to the
median and mean unemployment duration in this sample, respectively. Panel B shows a marginal
eﬀect of JSA of about 15% on the probability to exit within three months for youths, and about 9%
for adults. The eﬀects on the six months’ exit rate, reported in Panel C, are substantially lower.
This is to be expected because the new JSA rules kick in at the beginning of an unemployment
spell, and thus this is when they are more likely to make a diﬀerence to exit rates.
Table 2 thus replicates the main result of the JSA evaluation literature, namely its strong
and signiﬁcant impact on the exit rate from unemployment. But moving claimants oﬀ beneﬁts
may not be equivalent to moving them on to new jobs. The LLMDB does not allow me to fully
characterize unemployment destinations, because it does not contain information on starting dates
of employment spells, but I can use information on weeks worked and earnings for the ﬁscal year
after treatment (and for later years) in order to assess the impact of JSA on both employment and
post-unemployment earnings.
Figure 15 present estimates of the eﬀect of JSA on post-unemployment outcomes for the young.
These estimates are analogous to the post-treatment estimates presented in Figure 13, but unlike
in Figure 13 they control for observable characteristics, including the pre-treatment trends.
Panel A shows that the eﬀect of JSA on the probability of having positive earnings in the
ﬁve years after the reference unemployment spell. Estimates provided for year zero are hard to
interpret because, given yearly information on employment and earnings, may reﬂect both pre-
treatment and post-treatment eﬀects. Speciﬁcally, earnings in the 1996 ﬁscal year for someone who
has an unemployment spell in 1996 may include both pre-unemployment and post-unemployment
earnings. This of course cannot happen from year 1 onwards. JSA implied a reduction of 5.4% in
14Extending employment and earnings histories 10 instead of 3 years back produced virtually identical results.
20the probability of positive earnings in the year after the shock for young workers, and this eﬀect is
statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The JSA eﬀect falls to 3.7% in the next year, and becomes
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero from year four. Registering for unemployment beneﬁts soon
after JSA introduction, as opposed to six months earlier, implies thus a signiﬁcant fall in the future
employment probability for the young, with fairly long-lived eﬀects.
Estimates for the eﬀect on the average level of earnings is presented in Panel B. Estimates are
negative from year 1 onwards, and reach a peak of about -900£ in year 4. They then become
non signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (at the 5% level) in year 5. The negative impact on average
earnings tends to reﬂect both a negative impact on the probability to work (see Panel A), and an
eﬀect on earnings, conditional on employment. This latter eﬀect is also negative between year 1
and year 4 (estimates not reported), but is not precisely estimated.
The eﬀect of JSA on weeks worked, reported in Panel C, tends to be negative and signiﬁcant in
year one, and similarly as for previous outcomes it tails oﬀ in the next four years. Finally, Panel D
reports estimates of the eﬀect of the JSA on (log) weekly earnings for those with positive earnings,
and these tend to be closer to zero and not signiﬁcant initially, but become signiﬁcant in years
3-5 after the job loss. It is probably hard to reconcile such late decline in weekly earnings with
the direct impact of JSA, because if anything one would expect an immediate eﬀect in the ﬁrst
year after the reference unemployment spell, which is gradually reabsorbed as individuals who are
initially mismatched search on-the-job for better matches. Some explanation of this behavior may
be related to the employment selection eﬀects of JSA. Panel A has shown that the JSA had an
important initial impact on the proportion of individuals in work, which fades gradually over the
next ﬁve years, as the treated catch up with the non-treated in their employment levels. Thus the
employment stock may be of relatively high quality among the treated initially, because only the
most able have initially found work, and then quality declines as the less-able among the treated
ﬁnd work. This selection mechanism may help explain why one does not ﬁnd a JSA eﬀect initially,
but ﬁnds instead a negative eﬀect in the following years.15
Figure 16 reports relevant results for the adults. In general, the associated estimates are smaller
in magnitude and less precise than for youths. Speciﬁcally, initial eﬀects are similar to those esti-
mated for youths, but beyond 2 years after an unemployment shock very few eﬀects are signiﬁcant
for adults re-employment outcomes.
In summary, eﬀects of JSA on this sample include a reduction in the probability to have positive
earnings after an unemployment shock, with negative eﬀects on total earnings and weeks worked,
and more moderate and less precise eﬀects on weekly earnings. These eﬀects are consistent with
15Another potential explanation, also based on selection mechanisms, could be that more able youths would take
some time out of the labor force to go back into education or Government training programmes. But no evidence on
this can be gathered from these data.
21moderate changes in reservation wages, but large changes in the composition of nonemployment
and overall labor market attachment. This is what would be predicted by a search model in which
the rise in job search requirements is relatively more important than the expected income loss
from dropping out of the unemployment register, as it could have well been the case for the JSA
introduction.
Finally, all eﬀects reported tend to be stronger and more precisely estimated for the younger
sample. One explanation could be that for youths eligible for UB, JSA introduction meant both an
increase in search requirements, and a reduction in the beneﬁt level, with ampliﬁed eﬀects on post-
unemployment outcomes. But as argued in Section 3 this explanation is unlikely, as the proportion
of individuals eligible for UB only represents a minority of observations. The other explanation is
that the eﬀects of search requirements alone may be heterogeneous and stronger for the youths.
The UK Government’s concern about poor re-employment prospects for young unemployed was
indeed behind the introduction of the New Deal for Young People in April 1998, which combined
JSA search requirements with intensive help with job search (see Blundell, Costa Dias, Meghir and
Van Reenen, 2004).
7.2 Future beneﬁt spells
Previous estimates show that the JSA raised the unemployment outﬂow, but at the same time
also raised the probability of not working at all in the following year, so one may wonder what
happens to individuals who leave the unemployment register but do not get long-lasting jobs. One
possibility is that they may experience new claimant unemployment spells, or apply for and obtain
other beneﬁts, which are not conditional on active job search.
To answer this question I use information on diﬀerent types of beneﬁt spells contained in the
LLMDB. The UK welfare system, like most systems, includes several types of beneﬁts, that can
be related to job search, income, health, work etc. For example, during the six months preceding
JSA introduction, between 8 April and 6 October 1996, the LLMDB registers about 45,000 new
beneﬁt spells for individuals aged 16-64. The most important category among these is represented
by unemployment beneﬁts, which account for about 80% of total spells starting in this time span.
The next category is represented by health-related beneﬁts, including Incapacity Beneﬁts and the
Disability Living Allowance. IB can be claimed by individuals who are unable to work because of ill
health or a disability, and accounts for about 9% of beneﬁt spells in the pre-JSA period. The DLA is
a beneﬁt for individuals who need personal care due to mental or physical disabilities, and accounts
for 4% of spells. Finally come in-work beneﬁts, represented by the Working Family Tax Credit,
which includes about 5% of beneﬁt spells. One year later, that is between 8 April and 6 October
1997, the LLMDB registers about 28,000 new beneﬁt spells. The importance of unemployment
22beneﬁts has declined to about 70%, and that of health-related beneﬁts has increased to 14% for
IB, and to 6% for DLA. In-work beneﬁts have also risen to 9%.
To look at the impact of the JSA on unemployment exits into other beneﬁts, I estimate a probit
version of equation (7), where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if an individual is receiving
beneﬁts of a given type within 3 or 6 months of the end of the reference unemployment spell, and
zero otherwise. Beneﬁt types considered here are unemployment beneﬁts (whether on UB/IS in the
old regime or JSA in the new regime), and IB. Destinations into other beneﬁt categories represent
a very small minority of this sample, and the corresponding estimates were always very close to
zero and thus not reported.
The results are reported in Table 3. All estimates for other beneﬁt destinations are positive
and in several cases signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. In general the estimated eﬀects tend to be
slightly larger and more precisely estimated when one looks at transitions within six, rather than
three months. Both youths and adults are about 3% more likely to experience new claimant un-
employment spells under the new JSA regime, though this eﬀect only reaches standard signiﬁcance
levels for the adults. Both groups are also more likely to start spells of IB, and the associated eﬀect
is signiﬁcant for both groups and slightly stronger for the adults.
The estimated impact of JSA on the take-up rate of IB is noteworthy for two reasons. First,
this impact is quite large in magnitude. For example: the associated point estimate is about 2.5%
for youths, and a simple rescaling of this coeﬃcient due to 50% of treatment in control group would
imply an impact of nearly 5%. This is a very large ﬁgure if compared to the baseline 5% transitions
into IB for the young in the 1996 control group (see Table 1). For the adults, the estimated eﬀect
is slightly stronger (about 6% if one rescales the obtained point estimate), and also the associate
baseline take-up rate of IB is slightly higher at about 9%. This piece of evidence ﬁts in the rising
trend in take-up rates of IB in the UK, and is consistent with the widespread view that individuals
who had lowest re-employment rates were informally advised by the Employment Service to apply
for IB (see Nickell and Quintini, 2002).
Second, while the impact of the new JSA rules on the average number of weeks spent on
beneﬁts would imply a reduction in beneﬁt expenditure, the take-up rate of new beneﬁts following
the reference unemployment spell makes conclusions on total beneﬁt expenditure more problematic.
One can attempt a very crude back-of-envelope calculation of the impact of JSA on total beneﬁt
expenditure by combining the estimates presented above with data on weekly beneﬁt payments
and their average duration.16 Table 1 shows a reduction in unemployment duration by about 11%,
roughly corresponding to 6 weeks once rescaling is taken into account. This implies savings of about
295£ per person treated by JSA. However, Table 3 shows that this person is 5-6% more likely to
16Needless to say, this is not supposed to be indicative of the JSA’s eﬀects on overall welfare.
23start a spell on IB shortly after completion of a JSA-covered unemployment spell. Average IB
duration in the post-JSA period is about 49 weeks, and weekly beneﬁts in 1996/97 were £46.15 for
the ﬁrst 28 weeks, and then increased to £54.55 from week 29 onwards. These ﬁgures thus imply an
expected IB cost of about £134 per person treated, which erodes about 45% of the initial beneﬁt
savings. If on top of this one takes into account that individuals treated are also more likely to
start a new unemployment spell within six months of completing their current spell, net savings on
beneﬁts per person treated fall further to £55.
7.3 Robustness tests
The adopted deﬁnition of control and treatment groups, as well as some features of the data, require
a number of robustness checks. First, as noted in Figure 9, the unemployment inﬂow frequency
has a marked weekly pattern, and this may reﬂect the timing of initial beneﬁt payments, rather
than the date a job loser initially approached the Employment Service. I thus converted the beneﬁt
spells data from daily into weekly, by moving each start date to the previous and following Mondays
in turn, and constructed treatment and control groups in the same way as explained in Section
6. The estimates obtained on this new sample were virtually identical to those obtained on the
original one.
Second, as treatment and control groups are selected according to their date of job loss for three
consecutive years, one may worry about interactions between seasonal factors and year eﬀects. For
example, if the labor market were in general tighter in the fall (when the treatment is selected) than
in the spring (when the control is selected), and this eﬀect were stronger in 1997 than in 1996, one
could potentially predict poorer lower relative re-employment prospects for the treatment group
in 1996 as a consequence of macroeconomic eﬀects. Evidence on macroeconomic eﬀects can be
provided by the monthly vacancy to unemployment ratio, which is typically used as a measure
of labor market tightness. This ratio increases roughly monotonically in Britain between January
1996 and December 1998, and thus shows no evidence of diﬀerent seasonal patterns in 1996, 1997
and 1998. As a ﬁnal check, I repeated the main estimates controlling for the value of labor market
tightness in the month of job loss, and the results stayed largely unchanged.
Third, I run a falsiﬁcation test, based on treatment and control groups for 1997, 1998 and 1999,
constructed in the same way as I previously did for 1996, 1997 and 1998. If my previous estimates
identify the eﬀect of JSA, one should obtain no signiﬁcant eﬀects of an interaction term between
the treatment and the 1997 cohort on this new sample, for any of the post-unemployment outcomes
considered. This is indeed what I obtain, as shown in Table 4 for exits into other beneﬁt spells,
and in Figures 17 and 18 for post-unemployment earnings and weeks worked.
Finally, I follow a slightly diﬀerent estimation strategy from the DID strategy used above. As
24already mentioned, a potential drawback of my DID strategy is that JSA coverage in the control
group is not zero, because treatment and control are selected on the basis of a spell start date. This
problem would not exist if one selected them based on a spell end date, except that the treatment
dummy would be endogenous with respect to individual characteristics. A possible solution consists
in estimating the eﬀect of treatment (i.e. terminating an unemployment spell on or after 7 October
1996) on post-unemployment outcomes, having instrumented the probability if treatment by entry
date, and controlled for seasonality using later entry cohorts. I thus select all unemployment beneﬁt
spells started between April 1996 and March 1999, corresponding to the full 1996-1998 ﬁscal years,
and estimate an equation of the form:





β3jQij + β4JSAi + γXi + εi, (9)
where C96
i and C97
i refer to entry cohorts, Qij is quarter of entry, and JSA = 1 for spells ended
on or after 7 October 1996 and zero otherwise. The JSA variable is in turn instrumented by the
distance between fall 1996 and the calendar quarter of entry. In particular, I create a variable z
equal to min(Fall 1996 −calendar quarter of entry,0), and then use z and z2 as instruments for
JSA.
The identiﬁcation strategy here is conceptually similar to that of the rest of the paper, namely
that seasonal factors be constant across entry cohorts. However, the diﬀerent sampling of entry
cohorts and diﬀerent construction of the treatment variable should provide a robustness check for
estimates presented above. The results obtained are quite similar to those obtained using DID
estimates. In particular, JSA treatment raises the probability to start an IB spell by around 4%
(see bottom panel in Table 5). It reduces the probability of having positive earnings in the year
after the shock for both the young and the adult samples by about 5% (see Panel A in Figures 19
and 20), and again has a negative impact on annual earnings, which is stronger for the young than
for the adult sample (see Panel B in Figures 19 and 20). Note that these estimates do not need
to be rescaled, given the diﬀerent deﬁnition of treatment from the DID case, and thus imply an
overall weaker eﬀect of JSA on postunemployment outcomes than estimates based on DID.
8 Conclusions
This paper has investigated the post-unemployment eﬀects of higher job search requirements, ex-
ploiting variation provided by the introduction of the UK JSA in October 1996. In a simple job
search framework, one expects that tighter requirements for UI eligibility lower the reservation
wage and thus the quality of post-unemployment jobs, and raises the fraction of nonclaimant non-
employed, with consequences on labor market attachment and job search eﬀort.
25Using administrative longitudinal data on spells on unemployment beneﬁts and earnings, I ﬁnd
that JSA has had a positive and signiﬁcant impact on the claimant unemployment exit rate, as well
as on exits into other beneﬁts, and a negative and signiﬁcant impact on the probability of working
for up to four years following an unemployment spell. Starting a spell soon after JSA introduction,
as opposed to six months earlier, raises the likelihood of a spell on Incapacity Beneﬁts by about
2.5-3%, and lowers the likelihood of positive earnings by about 4-5%, together with the level of
earnings and the number of weeks worked. Weekly earnings (conditional on work) also seem to be
lower for the treated individuals, but the conﬁdence intervals around these estimated eﬀects are
quite large to exclude a wider variety of scenarios. Overall, all the estimated eﬀects tend to be
stronger for the 16-24 than the 25-64 year old sample.
A possible interpretation is that tighter search requirements implied by the JSA indeed moved
claimants oﬀ unemployment beneﬁts, without really raising job ﬁnding rates. Among claimants
treated by the JSA, those who found jobs quickly did not see their fortunes much changed with
respect to the previous regime, as implied by the absence of signiﬁcant eﬀects on weekly earnings
in the year following job loss. But those who left the unemployment register without ﬁnding a job
might have in general become detached from the labor market - for example by no longer perceiving
themselves as “workers”, as they were no covered by labor force welfare - and in particular were
more likely to start spells on beneﬁts that were not search related, with detrimental eﬀects on their
search eﬀort and fairly long-lasting eﬀects on their employment rates. This was reﬂected in a net
loss in (unconditional) weeks worked and earnings with respect to the previous system during about
three years after a job loss.
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Characteristics of treatment and control groups 
 
  Youths 16-24  Adults 25-64 
  Control  Treatment  Control  Treatment 
1996 cohort  Mean  St.d.  Mean  St.d.  Mean  St.d.  Mean  St.d. 
Age   21.1  2.2  21.2  2.2  38.7  10.5  39.1  10.3 
Duration of current spell days  185.0  246.4  165.6  216.9  220.9  360.0  189.0  317.5 
Within 6 month of completion:                 
               % on new unemployment spell   42.7    47.2    34.2    37.3   
               % on incapacity benefits spell   5.0    7.0    9.1    10.9   
Number of spells  1515  1433  2509  2901 
1997 and 1998 cohorts  Mean  St.d.  Mean  St.d.  Mean  St.d.  Mean  St.d. 
Age   21.0  2.3  21.0  2.2  38.6  10.3  38.8  10.3 
Duration of current spell days  132.2  180.4  133.4  163.9  196.3  306.0  189.0  287.1 
Within 6 month of completion:                 
               % on new unemployment spell   49.1    50.4    37.8    37.9   
               % on incapacity benefits spell   7.7    7.7    12.0    10.9   







Impact of JSA on claimant outflow 
 
Panel A:  Cox proportional hazard model 






(s.e)  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.033)  (0.034) 
Observations  8450  8450  16202  16200 
Other controls  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Panel B: Whether completed a spell within 3 months 






(s.e)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.017)  (0.017) 
Observations  8532  8532  16350  16348 
Other controls  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Panel C: Whether completed a spell within 6 months 






(s.e)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.014)  (0.014) 
Observations  8532  8532  16350  16348 
Other controls  No  Yes  No  Yes 
 
Notes. Estimation methods: Cox proportional hazard model in Panel A and probit model in Panels B and C (marginal 
effects reported). JSA=C
96*T (see equation (7)), and regressions also control for T, C
96 and C
97 separately. Other 
controls included are: age, age squared, total weeks worked in each of the previous 3 years and their square, total 
earnings in each of the previous 3 years and their square. Standard errors are clustered at the monthly inflow level and 
reported in brackets. 
***, 
** and 
* denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Table 3 
The impact of JSA on exit into other benefit spells 
 
New claimant unemployment spell within 3 months 
  Youths (16-24)  Adults (25-64) 
JSA  0.024  0.024  0.031**  0.030** 
(s.e)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.015)  (0.015) 
Observations  8532  8532  16350  16348 
Other controls  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Spell of Incapacity Benefits within 3 months 
  Youths (16-24)  Adults (25-64) 
JSA  0.020*  0.020*  0.025**  0.022** 
(s.e)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.011) 
Observations  8532  8532  16350  16348 
Other controls  No  Yes  No  Yes 
New claimant unemployment spell within 6 months 
  Youths (16-24)  Adults (25-64) 
JSA  0.034  0.035  0.029*  0.028* 
(s.e)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.016)  (0.016) 
Observations  8532  8532  16350  16348 
Other controls  No  Yes  No  yes 
Spell of Incapacity Benefits within 6 months 
  Youths (16-24)  Adults (25-64) 
JSA  0.025*  0.024*  0.032***  0.029** 
(s.e)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
Observations  8532  8532  16350  16348 
Other controls  No  Yes  No  Yes 
 
Notes. The outcome variable is 1 if a new benefit spell has started within 3 or 6 months since the end of the current 
spell. Estimation method: probit (marginal effects are reported). JSA=C
96*T (see equation (7)), and regressions also 
control for T, C
96 and C
97 separately. Other controls included are: age, age squared, total weeks worked in each of the 
previous 3 years and their square, total earnings in each of the previous 3 years and their square. Standard errors are 
clustered at the monthly inflow level and reported in brackets. 
***, 
** and 






The impact of JSA on exit into other benefit spells 
Falsification test on 1997, 1998 and 1999cohorts 
 
New claimant unemployment spell within 3 months 
  Youths (16-24)  Adults (25-64) 
JSA  0.015  0.012  0.004  0.001 
(s.e)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.014)  (0.014) 
Observations  8531  8531  16182  16179 
Other controls  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Spell of Incapacity Benefits within 3 months 
  Youths (16-24)  Adults (25-64) 
JSA  -0.010  -0.011  0.007  0.005 
(s.e)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.009) 
Observations  8531  8531  16182  16179 
Other controls  No  Yes  No  Yes 
New claimant unemployment spell within 6 months 
  Youths (16-24)  Adults (25-64) 
JSA  0.011  0.008  0.015  0.012 
(s.e)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.016)  (0.016) 
Observations  8531  8531  16182  16179 
Other controls  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Spell of Incapacity Benefits within 6 months 
  Youths (16-24)  Adults (25-64) 
JSA  -0.006  -0.007  0.009  0.007 
(s.e)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.010) 
Observations  8531  8531  16182  16179 
Other controls  No  Yes  No  Yes 
 
 
Notes. The sample includes the 1997, 1998, and 1999 cohorts of unemployment entrants. The outcome variable is 1 if 
a new benefit spell has started within 3 or 6 months since the end of the current spell. Estimation method: probit 
(marginal effects are reported). JSA=C
97*T, and regressions also control for T, C
97 and C
98 separately. Other controls 
included are: age, age squared, total weeks worked in each of the previous 3 years and their square, total earnings in 




* denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  Table 5 
The impact of JSA on exit into other benefit spells 
IV estimates 
 
New claimant unemployment spell within 3 months 
  Youths (16-24)  Adults (25-64) 
JSA  0.047**  0.047**  0.029**  0.029** 
(s.e)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.014)  (0.014) 
Observations  16533  16533  32771  32769 
Other controls  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Spell of Incapacity Benefits within 3 months 
  Youths (16-24)  Adults (25-64) 
JSA  0.029**  0.029**  0.019  0.013 
(s.e)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
Observations  16533  16533  32771  32769 
Other controls  No  Yes  No  Yes 
New claimant unemployment spell within 6 months 
  Youths (16-24)  Adults (25-64) 
JSA  0.087***  0.086***  0.037  0.032 
(s.e)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.024)  (0.024) 
Observations  16533  16533  32771  32769 
Other controls  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Spell of Incapacity Benefits within 6 months 
  Youths (16-24)  Adults (25-64) 
JSA  0.044***  0.042***  0.037**  0.030* 
(s.e)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.015) 
Observations  16533  16533  32771  32769 
Other controls  No  Yes  No  Yes 
 
 
Notes. The outcome variable is 1 if a new benefit spell has started within 3 or 6 months since the end of the current 
spell. Estimation method: IV, where JSA is equal to 1 if a spell ends on or after 7 October 1996, and is instrumented 
by the distance between Fall 1996 and the quarter of entry. Regressions also control for quarter of entry and yearly 
cohort of entry. Other controls included are: age, age squared, total weeks worked in each of the previous 3 years and 
their square, total earnings in each of the previous 3 years and their square. Standard errors are clustered at the 
monthly inflow level and reported in brackets. 
***, 
** and 
* denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. Figure 1: 
Flows out of and into the claimant unemployment register 
Monthly data seasonally adjusted. Source: NOMIS 
 
 
Figure 2:  
The claimant count and ILO unemployment 
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Figure 3: 
Registered unemployment and Incapacity Benefits 
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s1 Figure 7 
Raw employment and earnings time series from the LLMDB 
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Claimant unemployment spells started 1 Jan 1996-31 Dec 1998 
















































Claimant unemployment spells started 1 Sept -31 Oct 1996.  









































Claimant unemployment spells ended 1 Jan 1996-31 Dec 1998 
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 Figure 11 
Labor market trends for the Youth sample (16-24) 
Source: LLMDB 
 


























1985 1990 1995 2000 20051985 1990 1995 2000 20051985 1990 1995 2000 2005

































































1985 1990 1995 2000 20051985 1990 1995 2000 20051985 1990 1995 2000 2005

















Graphs by cohortFigure 11 (continued) 
Labor market trends for the Youth sample (16-24) 
Source: LLMDB 
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Graphs by cohortFigure 12  
Labor market trends for the Adult sample (25-64) 
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Graphs by cohortFigure 12  (continued) 
Labor market trends for the Adult sample (25-64) 
 
Panel C: Annual weeks worked 
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Graphs by cohortFigure 13 













-12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
years from shock


























-12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
years from shock
















-12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
years from shock




















-12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
years from shock
Panel D: Log weekly earnings
 
Notes. The solid line represents marginal effects (Panel A) or coefficients (Panels B-D) on the C
96*T interaction (see equation (7)), and regressions also control for T, C
96 and C
97 separately. The 
dashed lines represent 90% and 95% confidence intervals, with standard errors clustered at the monthly unemployment entry level. Year zero denotes 1996 for the 1996 cohort; 1997 for the 1997 
cohort and 1998 for the 1998 cohort. Sample: Males 16-24. Source: LLMDB. Figure 14 
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Panel D: Log weekly earnings
 
Notes. The solid line represents marginal effects (Panel A) or coefficients (Panels B-D) on the C
96*T interaction (see equation (7)), and regressions also control for T, C
96 and C
97 separately. The 
dashed lines represent 90% and 95% confidence intervals, with standard errors clustered at the monthly unemployment entry level. Year zero denotes 1996 for the 1996 cohort; 1997 for the 1997 
cohort and 1998 for the 1998 cohort. Sample: Males 25-64. Source: LLMDB. Figure 15 
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Panel D: Log weekly earnings
  
Notes. The solid line represents marginal effects (Panel A) or coefficients (Panels B-D) on the C
96*T interaction (see equation (7)), and regressions also control for T, C
96 and C
97 separately. Other 
controls included are: age and its square, weeks worked and annual earnings in the three years before the shock and their square. Standard errors are clustered at the monthly inflow level. The 
dashed lines represent 90% and 95% confidence intervals. Year zero denotes 1996 for the 1996 cohort; 1997 for the 1997 cohort and 1998 for the 1998 cohort. Sample: Males 16-24. Source: 
LLMDB. Figure 16 
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Panel D: Log weekly earnings
 
 
Notes. The solid line represents marginal effects (Panel A) or coefficients (Panels B-D) on the C
96*T interaction (see equation (7)), and regressions also control for T, C
96 and C
97 separately. Other 
controls included are: age and its square, weeks worked and annual earnings in the three years before the shock and their square. Standard errors are clustered at the monthly inflow level. The 
dashed lines represent 90% and 95% confidence intervals. Year zero denotes 1996 for the 1996 cohort; 1997 for the 1997 cohort and 1998 for the 1998 cohort. Sample: Males 25-64. Source: 
LLMDB. Figure 17 
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Panel D: Log weekly earnings
 
Notes. The sample includes the 1997, 1998 and 1999 unemployment entry cohorts. The solid line represents marginal effects (Panel A) or coefficients (Panels B-D) on the C
97*T interaction, and 
regressions also control for treatment, C
97 and C
98 separately. Other controls included are: age and its square, weeks worked and annual earnings in the three years before the shock and their square. 
Standard errors are clustered at the monthly inflow level. The dashed lines represent 90% and 95% confidence intervals. Year zero denotes 1997 for the 1997 cohort; 1998 for the 1998 cohort and 
1999 for the 1999 cohort. Sample: Males 16-24. Source: LLMDB. 
 Figure 18 
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Panel D: Log weekly earnings
 
Notes. The sample includes the 1997, 1998 and 1999 unemployment entry cohorts. The solid line represents marginal effects (Panel A) or coefficients (Panels B-D) on the C
97*T interaction, and 
regressions also control for T, C
97 and C
98 separately. Other controls included are: age and its square, weeks worked and annual earnings in the three years before the shock and their square. 
Standard errors are clustered at the monthly inflow level. The dashed lines represent 90% and 95% confidence intervals. Year zero denotes 1997 for the 1997 cohort; 1998 for the 1998 cohort and 
1999 for the 1999 cohort. Sample: Males 25-64. Source: LLMDB. Figure 19 







































Notes. The solid line represents coefficients on the JSA variable (see equation (8)), where JSA is equal to 1 if a spell ends on or after 7 October 1996, and is instrumented by the distance between 
Fall 1996 and the quarter of entry. Regressions also control for quarter of entry and yearly cohort of entry. Other controls included are: age and its square, weeks worked and annual earnings in the 
three years before the shock and their square. Standard errors are clustered at the monthly inflow level. The dashed lines represent 90% and 95% confidence intervals. Year zero denotes 1996 for 
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Panel D: Log weekly earningsFigure 20 







































Notes. The solid line represents coefficients on the JSA variable (see equation (8)), where JSA is equal to 1 if a spell ends on or after 7 October 1996, and is instrumented by the distance between 
Fall 1996 and the quarter of entry. Regressions also control for quarter of entry and yearly cohort of entry. Other controls included are: age and its square, weeks worked and annual earnings in the 
three years before the shock and their square. Standard errors are clustered at the monthly inflow level. The dashed lines represent 90% and 95% confidence intervals. Year zero denotes 1996 for 

















0 1 2 3 4 5 6
years from shock



































0 1 2 3 4 5 6
years from shock

















0 1 2 3 4 5 6
years from shock



















0 1 2 3 4 5 6
years from shock
Panel D: Log weekly earnings